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CRIMINAL LAW- MARYLAND ADOPTS THE MODEL PENAL 
CODE'S SUBSTANTIAL STEP TEST FOR CRIMINAL ATTEMPT. 
Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 493 A.2d 352 (1985). 
After several banks in the same vicinity were robbed, the police set 
up a surveillance of the banks in that area. 1 The police observed the 
defendant examine the premises of several banks, then park his car at the 
rear of one of the banks. The defendant got out of his car wearing an 
eyepatch, sunglasses, a knit cap, white surgical gloves, and a turned up 
collar. When he approached the bank, the defendant had his right hand 
in his jacket pocket, which contained a revolver, and his left hand held in 
front of his face. 2 He attempted to open the bank door, but discovered it 
was locked. The defendant returned to his car and hastily departed from 
the premises, but was apprehended shortly thereafter. A jury sitting in 
the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George's County convicted the 
defendant of attempted armed robbery. 3 The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland rejected the defendant's contention that the evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain the verdict and affirmed the conviction.4 On certio-
rari, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the Model Penal Code's 
"substantial step" test for criminal attempts to determine whether the 
defendant's conduct constituted attempted armed robbery. 5 A unani-
mous court held that the defendant's actions satisfied the substantial step 
test and affirmed the conviction.6 
Defining criminal attempt has been called a "task more intricate and 
difficult of comprehension than any other branch of criminal law."7 
Although nonexistent at early common law, the doctrine of criminal at-
tempt evolved from the English law of treason8 and the Court of Star 
Chamber.9 Criminal attempt embodies conduct that is designed, but fails 
l. Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 305, 493 A.2d 352, 355 (1985). The Special Opera-
tions Division of the Prince George's County Police Department had set up the 
surveillance. 
2. /d. at 306, 493 A.2d at 356. 
3. /d. at 304, 493 A.2d at 355. The defendant also was convicted for transporting a 
handgun. He was sentenced to 20 years on the attempt conviction and a consecu-
tive three years on the handgun conviction. /d. 
4. Young v. State, No. 84-1429, slip. op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 14, 1984), aff'd, 
303 Md. 298, 493 A.2d 352 (1985) (per curiam). 
5. Young, 303 Md. at 311, 493 A.2d at 358. The court adopted the State of Maryland 
Commission on Criminal Law Proposed Criminal Code § 110.00 (1972) which fol-
lowed the Model Penal Code§ 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & Supp. 1985), 
the originator of the substantial step test. /d. at 311-12, 493 A.2d at 359. 
6. /d. at 311, 493 A.2d at 358. 
7. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 222, 223, 9 S.E. 1024, 1025 (1889). 
8. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 563-65 (2d ed. 1960). Early 
English statutes provided that it was treason to wish, will, desire by words or writ-
ing, or attempt harm to the King or his family. /d. 
9. /d. at 565. The Court of Star Chamber was formed to correct the shortcomings of 
the common law courts and deal with many cases that today would be considered 
criminal attempts. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW 496 (2d ed. 
1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ScoTT]. 
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to result in the completion of a substantive offense. 10 Under common 
law, 11 still followed by a minority of jurisdictions, 12 a criminal attempt 
conviction requires proof of three elements: (1) the intent to do a crimi-
nal act, (2) an overt act in furtherance of that intent, and (3) the failure of 
that overt act to result in the completion of a substantive offense. 13 Ac-
cordingly, if there is reasonable doubt concerning whether a crime was 
completely committed, the defendant is not guilty of either a substantive 
offense or a criminal attempt. 14 Thus, under the minority view, the ac-
cused can be too guilty to be convicted of a criminal attempt. 15 
Under the majority view the overt act need not fail to result in the 
completion of a substantive offense. 16 Nevertheless, the defendant must 
have the intent to do a criminal act 17 and act in furtherance of that in-
tent.18 Traditionally, the intent element is satisfied when the underlying 
substantive crime includes specific intent as an element and the accused 
possesses that intent; 19 proof that the accused possesses a general intent 
to engage in criminal activity is insufficient.20 To determine whether the 
10. For the history and rationale of attempt liability, see LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 
9, at 495-500; J. HALL, supra note 8, at 558-74. 
11. See Note, Supreme Court of Rhode Island Adopts Model Penal Code Definition of 
Criminal Attempt, 17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 339, 340-41 (1983) [hereinafter Note, 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island]; see also United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 
1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 
654, 660 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 743 F.2d 1114, cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1983). 
12. See Lightfoot v. State, 278 Md. 231, 233-34, 360 A.2d 426, 427-28 (1976); see also 
Moffet v. State, 96 Nev. 822, 824, 618 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1980); State v. Jones, 227 
N.C. 402, 405, 42 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1944); Poteat v. State, 672 P.2d 45, 47 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1983). 
13. SeeR. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 612-17 (3d ed. 1982). Because at-
tempt at common law was a misdemeanor, the assumption that the failure of the 
crime was required may have been derived from the old common law rule of 
merger, whereby if the act resulted in both a felony (completed crime) and a misde-
meanor (attempted crime), the misdemeanor merged into the felony. /d. at 614. 
See also Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L. Rev. 319, 
320-25 (1954-1955) (discussing the impact on attempt liability caused by the failure 
to consummate the crime). 
14. United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 
(1978). 
15. United States v. Fleming, 215 A.2d 839, 840-41 (D.C. 1966) (the defendant could go 
free not because he was innocent but because he was too guilty). 
16. Lightfoot v. State, 278 Md. 231, 233-34, 360 A.2d 426, 427-28 (1976). 
17. E.g., United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1983); State v. McEl-
roy, 128 Ariz. 315,317,625 P.2d 904,906 (1981); People v. Patskan, 387 Mich. 701, 
714, 199 N.W.2d 458, 463 (1972). 
18. E.g., Lemke v. United States, 211 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 
(1954); People v. Elmore, 50 Ill. 2d 10, 12, 276 N.E.2d 325, 326 (1971); State v. 
Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 187, 244 A.2d 499, 502, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 952 (1968). 
19. E.g., People v. Weeks, 86 Ill. App. 2d 480, 485, 230 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1967); Scott v. 
Scott, 274 Ind. 687, 689, 413 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1980); People v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 
738, 739, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (1964). 
20. The defendant cannot be convicted of attempt if the underlying substantive offense 
does not include specific intent as an element. See, e.g., State v. Almeda, 189 Conn. 
303, 309, 455 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1983) (involuntary manslaughter); Rhode v. State, 
181 Ind. App. 265, 268-69, 391 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1979) (reckless homicide); State v. 
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defendant's conduct is in furtherance of that intent, the trier of fact must 
engage in a more difficult analysis. 21 Courts have employed several dif-
ferent tests to aid the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant's 
conduct is in furtherance of a specific intent to commit a substantive 
crime: (1) the "proximity" test, (2) the "equivocality" test, and (3) the 
"probable desistence" test. 22 
These tests, however, are inadequate because they either fail to focus 
on the dangerousness of the defendant or provide insufficient guidelines 
to determine attempt liability. For example, under the proximity test the 
conduct must be proximate or directly tending toward the completion of 
the crime. 23 The more proximate the act is to the completed crime, the 
more likely it is in furtherance of that crime.24 The test is criticized for 
focusing on dangerous conduct rather than identifying dangerous 
individuals. 25 
Grant, 418 A.2d 154, 156-57 (Me. 1980) (fourth or fifth degree homicide). Contra 
Model Penal Code§ 5.01(1)(b) comments at 305 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & 
Supp. 1985); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 705-500(2) (1976); Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 41-701 (1977); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-201 (1979). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1980) (determination 
is so dependent on the particular factual context of each case that there can be no 
litmus test to guide the courts), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981 ); United States v. 
Busic, 549 F.2d 252, 257 n.9 (2d Cir. 1977) Gudicial inquiry into whether defendant 
is chargeable with attempt is necessarily predictive); United States v. Noreikis, 481 
F.2d 1173, 1181 (7th Cir.) (distinction between preparation and attempt is incapable 
of being formulated into a hard and fast rule), vacated, 415 U.S. 904, cert. denied, 
415 u.s. 904 (1973). 
22. See Model Penal Code§ 5.01 comments at 321-29 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & 
Supp. 1985). See generally LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at 503-09 (discussing 
various tests used to evaluate the defendant's conduct); J. HALL, supra note 8, at 
579-86 (outlining competing theories); Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of 
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, 
Solicitation & Conspiracy, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 571, 586-92 (1961) (discussing the 
general distinction between preparation and attempt) [hereinafter Wechsler]. 
23. See Model Penal Code§ 5.01 comments at 321-23 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & 
Supp. 1985); Wechsler, supra note 21, at 586-87. 
24. Courts have applied several versions of this test. One English court defined proxim-
ity in terms of the "last proximate act" before the completion of the intended crime. 
Regina v. Eagleton, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 559, 571 (Crim. App. 1885); see also Wechs-
ler, supra note 21, at 586 n.88. Later English cases rejected this view. Regina v. 
Roberts, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 39 (Crim. App. 1885). American courts have never 
recognized the "last proximate act" as a viable test. See, e.g., Lett v. State, I SO Ga. 
App. 132, 133, 257 S.E.2d 37, 38 (1979); People v. White, 84 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 
1047, 406 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1980); State v. Olds, 603 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Mo. 1980). 
American courts, however, have applied a "physical proximity" test. See, e.g., Giles 
v. United States, 157 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 813 
(1947); Gilley v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 306,316, 133 S.W.2d 67,73 (1939); State 
v. Stewart, 537 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Mo. 1976). Several courts have found liability 
when the defendant has achieved a "dangerous proximity to success." See, e.g., 
People v. Paluch, 78 Ill. App. 2d 356, 359, 222 N.E.2d 508, 510 (1966); People v. 
Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 300, 360 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (1977); People v. Leary, 64 
A.D.2d 825, 825, 407 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (1978). 
25. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 
(1977); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9; at 504-06. 
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Under the equivocality test26 the conduct unequivocally must mani-
fest an intent to commit a crime. 27 The test deemphasizes the defend-
ant's subjective state of mind by focusing on the dangerousness of the 
conduct, 28 but is criticized for assuming a positive relationship between 
the defendant's state of mind and the external appearance of his 
conduct. 29 
Under the probable desistence test the conduct must advance be-
yond a point where the defendant would voluntarily, without interrup-
tion from an outside source, cease efforts to complete the intended 
crime. 30 The test is intended to focus on the dangerousness of the de~ 
fendant by emphazing the defendant's personality,31 but is criticized be-
cause application results in an objective rather than subjective review of 
the defendant's conduct. 32 Other tests have been proposed, but for simi-
lar reasons also have proven inadequate.33 
No bright line test has emerged to determine when the defendant's 
conduct warrants liability for criminal attempt. Nevertheless, the trend 
among jurisdictions is toward adopting the substantial step test espoused 
by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (Code).34 Under the 
substantial step test a defendant's conduct must represent a substantial 
step toward the commission of the intended crime and be strongly cor-
roborated by a wrongful purpose. 35 
By focusing on the dangerousness of the defendant rather than the 
dangerousness of the defendant's conduct, the substantial step test over-
comes the shortcomings of the prior tests. 36 The substantial step test 
26. The equivocality test is also referred to as the "res ipsa loquitur" test. See Model 
Penal Code§ 5.01 comments at 326 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & Supp. 1985). 
27. !d. comments at 326-29. 
28. E.g., Fryer v. Nix, 775 F.2d 979, 993 (8th Cir. 1985) (act must be unequivocal in 
nature); State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 581, 627 P.2d 721, 732 (1981) (crime of 
attempt focuses directly upon unequivocal steps taken toward consummating the 
intended crime); State v. Fender, 358 N. W.2d 248, 252 (S.D. 1984) (defendant's 
intent is irrelevant because intent may be shown by acts); Hamiel v. State, 92 Wis. 
2d 656, 667, 285 N.W.2d 639, 645 (1979) (taking into consideration all facts and 
circumstances, a defendant's conduct constitutes criminal attempt if there is no 
other reasonable conclusion but that he intended to attain a result which would 
constitute a crime). 
29. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 
(1971). J. HALL, supra note 8, at 580-83; LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, at 508. 
30. See, e.g., Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 n.40 (5th Cir. 1967); People v. 
Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 718, 256 P.2d 317, 321 (1953); State v. Lewis, 69 Wash. 2d 
120, 124-25, 417 P.2d 618, 621 (1966). 
31. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 comments at 325 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & 
Supp. 1985). 
32. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d at 119; LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 10, at 
506-07. 
33. See Model Penal Code§ 5.01 comments at 323-26 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & 
Supp. 1985) (identifying the "indispensible element" and "abnormal step" tests). 
34. Model Penal Code§ 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & Supp. 1985). 
35. ld; see also Wechsler, supra note 22, at 593. 
36. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 comments at 298 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & 
Supp. 1985); see also Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 705-500 comments at 286 (1976). 
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identifies a person who has demonstrated a firm disposition to commit a 
substantive crime. 37 This is achieved by emphasizing what the defendant 
has done rather than what conduct is necessary to consummate the sub-
stantive offense. 38 Consequently, the substantial step test permits a find-
ing of attempt liability based on steps already performed, even though 
the defendant may be far from completing the substantive crime. 39 
The Code's approach to affirmative defenses for criminal attempt is 
also consistent with its focus on the defendant's dangerousness. First, 
the Code recognizes the abandonment defense. 40 Abandonment is an af-
firmative defense whereby the defendant manifests a complete and volun-
tary renunciation of his criminal purpose.41 This defense is based upon 
the rationale that renunciation of the criminal purpose tends to negate an 
actor's dangerousness,42 and the ability to abandon an attempt without 
liability provides an actor with the motivation to desist from his criminal 
effort.43 
Second, the Code eliminates impossibility as an affirmative de-
fense.44 The impossibility defense arises when the defendant has done 
everything in his power to accomplish the result desired, but because of 
external circumstances, he fails to commit a substantive crime.45 Two 
variations of the defense exist- factual and legal impossibility. Factual 
impossibility exists when the substantive offense cannot be completed be-
cause of some physical impossibility unknown to the accused at the time 
of his misdeed.46 Legal impossibility exists when the substantive offense 
cannot be completed because of the absence of an essential element of the 
substantive crime.47 By providing that the defendant's conduct should 
37. Model Penal Code§ 5.01 comments at 298 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & Supp. 
1985). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d at 119; State v. Green, 194 Conn. 258, 
277, 480 A.2d 526, 537, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191 (1984); Howell v. State, 157 Ga. 
App. 451, 456, 278 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1981). 
39. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d at 119. 
40. See Model Penal Code§ 5.01(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & Supp. 1985). 
41. /d. The abandonment must originate with the actor and must not be influenced by 
external circumstances that increase the probability of detection or make it more 
difficult to complete the crime. Also, the abandonment must be permanent rather 
than temporary or contingent. /d. comments at 358. If, however, the actor has put 
in motion forces that he is powerless to stop, the attempt has been completed and 
cannot be abandoned. !d. comments at 360. 
42. /d. comments at 359. 
43. /d. 
44. See Model Penal Code§ 5.01(1)(a)-(c) comments at 307-21 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962 & Supp. 1985). 
45. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at 438-40, 442-45 (discussing the 
defense of impossibility); Wechsler, supra note 22, at 578-85. 
46. If the defendant was not mistaken about an issue of fact, he would have known that 
his attempt had no possibility of success. See In re Appeal No. 568, Term 1974, 25 
Md. App. 218, 333 A.2d 649, cert. denied, 275 Md. 751 (1975). 
47. There are two types of "legal impossibility" defenses: (I) "true legal impossibility" 
arises where the completed crime could not have been committed even if the cir-
cumstances were as the accused supposed because the legislature had not elected to 
punish the supposed conduct, see Wilson v. State, 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905); 
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be measured according to the circumstances as he believed them to be, 48 
the Code's rejection of the impossibility defense reflects the shift in focus 
toward the dangerousness of the defendant.49 
The substantial step test also overcomes the shortcomings of the 
prior tests by establishing practical guidelines. To accomplish this, the 
Code enumerates seven examples of conduct that define a relatively firm 
commitment to complete a crime: (1) lying in wait, searching for or fol-
lowing the contemplated victim of the crime, (2) enticing or seeking to 
entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contem-
plated for the commission of the crime, (3) reconnoitering the place con-
templated for its commission, (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle, 
or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be commit-
ted, (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the 
crime which are specially designed for such unlawful use or that can 
serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances, (6) posses-
sion, collection, or fabrication of materials to be employed in the com-
mission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its 
commission, where such possession, collection, or fabrication serves no 
lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances, and (7) soliciting an 
innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the 
crime. 5° 
Although other jurisdictions have enacted a broad attempt statute, 5 1 
Maryland's criminal code provisions either define a particular attempt as 
a statutory crime or proscribe punishment for particular attempts. 52 
Consequently, Maryland courts have relied on developing common law 
to identify the scope of criminal attempt. 53 In Wiley v. State, 54 the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland followed early common law and the minority of 
(2) "mistake of fact relating to a legal relationship" arises where the defendant un-
derstands the law, but mistakenly believes that the facts bring his situation within 
the law, see People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906). 
48. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 (l)(a)-(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962 & Supp. 
1985). 
49. /d. comments at 315-17; see also Haw. Rev. Stat. § 705-500 comments at 286 
(1976). 
50. See Model Penal Code§ 5.01(2) comments at 332-47 (Proposed Official Draft 1962 
& Supp. 1985). 
51. Other states have enacted broad attempt statutes defining the substantive crime of 
attempt. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 531 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 
§ 152 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-1 (West 1982). 
52. See Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 301 n.1, 493 A.2d 352, 353 n.l (1985). 
53. In one of the earliest reported criminal attempt cases, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, without commenting on the elements of the crime, stated that one may 
"obviously" be innocent of a criminal act, but guilty of an attempt to commit the 
act. Whitley v. Warden of Maryland House of Corrections, 209 Md. 629, 630, 120 
A.2d 200, 200, appeal denied and cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 929 (1956). 
54. 237 Md. 560, 561, 207 A.2d 478, 478 (1965) (the defendant was convicted of at-
tempting to break into a real estate office with the intent to steal goods and money 
therein and of being a rogue and a vagabond); see also Franczkowski v. State, 239 
Md. 126, 210 A.2d 504 ( 1965) (following the elements for criminal attempt stated in 
Wiley). 
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jurisdictions by defining the elements of criminal attempt as (1) an intent 
to commit a crime, (2) conduct in furtherance of that intent, and (3) a 
failure to complete the crime. 55 Failure to complete the underlying crime 
remained an element of criminal attempt for more than a decade56 until 
the court of appeals decided Lightfoot v. StateY In Lightfoot, the de-
fendant was convicted of attempted armed robbery with a deadly 
weapon, despite evidence indicating that the robbery was completed. 58 
The court joined the majority of jurisdictions59 by holding that the fail-
ure to consummate the attempt was not an indispensible element of crim-
inal attempt. 60 
Notwithstanding, Maryland's approach to criminal attempt re-
mained inadequate because it failed to focus on the dangerousness of the 
defendant. To determine whether the defendant's conduct was in fur-
therance of an intent to complete a substantive offense, early Maryland 
case law implicitly applied the proximity test. 61 These cases required 
that the defendant have the apparent ability to commit the intended 
crime62 and one case required that the defendant take some act toward 
the completion of the intended crime. 63 
In 1972, the Maryland Commission on Criminal Law proposed a 
comprehensive criminal code that included a provision adopting the sub-
stantial step test, 64 but the proposal was never enacted. Consequently, 
the focus taken by Maryland courts in determining whether the defend-
ant's conduct warranted liability for criminal attempt remained inconsis-
55. Wiley v. State, 237 Md. 560, 561, 207 A.2d 478, 478 (1965). 
56. See Maloney v. State, 17 Md. App. 609, 304 A.2d 260 (1973); McDuffie v. State, 12 
Md. App. 264, 278 A.2d 307 (1971); Wiggins v. State, 8 Md. App. 598, 261 A.2d 
503 (1970); Reed v. State, 7 Md. App. 200, 253 A.2d 774 (1969); Price v. State, 3 
Md. App. 155, 238 A.2d 275 (1968); Tender v. State, 2 Md. App. 692, 237 A.2d 65 
(1968); Boone v. State, 2 Md. App. 80, 233 A.2d 476 (1967). Although quoted with 
approval, Wiley was not strictly adhered to by courts deciding cases involving com-
pleted crimes. E.g., McDuffie v. State, 12 Md. App. 264, 278 A.2d 307 (1971). In 
McDuffie, the defendant was convicted of both robbery and attempted robbery. Jd. 
at 266, 278 A.2d at 307. Under Wiley, the attempted robbery conviction was erro-
neous because the defendant completed the crime as evidenced by the robbery con-
viction. The appellate court reversed the guilty verdict on the attempt charge and 
left the consummated offense verdict unaltered. !d. at 271, 278 A.2d at 31 0; see also 
Tender v. State, 2 Md. App. 692, 237 A.2d 65 (1965); Price v. State, 3 Md. App. 
155, 238 A.2d 275 (1968). 
57. 278 Md. 231, 360 A.2d 426 (1976). On certiorari, the court of appeals limited its 
review to whether failure to complete the crime was an element of criminal attempt. 
/d. at 233, 360 A.2d at 427. 
58. Lightfoot v. State, 278 Md. 231, 233, 360 A.2d 426, 427 (1976). 
59. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
60. Lightfoot, 278 Md. at 237-38, 360 A.2d at 430. 
61. See cases cited infra notes 62-63. 
62. See Maloney v. State, 17 Md. App. 609, 304 A.2d 260 (1973); Wiggins v. State, 8 
Md. App. 598, 261 A.2d 503 (1970); Farley v. State, 3 Md. App. 584, 240 A.2d 296 
(1968). 
63. See Reed v. State, 7 Md. App. 200, 253 A.2d 774 (1969). 
64. See State of Maryland Commission on Criminal Law § 110.00 (Proposed Criminal 
Code 1972). 
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tent with that taken by the Code. Maryland also did not allow 
abandonment as an affirmative defense to criminal attempt. 65 The courts 
reasoned that once the overt act is committed by the defendant, it is too 
late to renounce what already has become a punishable offense. 66 Fur-
thermore, Maryland allowed legal impossibility as an affirmative defense 
where the impossibility arises by operation of the law.67 
Contrary to the Code, Maryland's approach to criminal attempt 
also provided insufficient guidelines to determine attempt liability. 
Although several earlier decisions defined the conduct in terms of going 
beyond mere preparation, they provided little assistance to the trier of 
fact in determining whether the defendant completed the attempt.68 
Hence, the application of the law to the facts remained a difficult task. 
In Young v. State,69 the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the 
substantial step test to determine whether a defendant's conduct consti-
tuted an overt act which went beyond mere preparation in furtherence of 
the commission of the intended crime. 70 The court characterized prior 
decisions that placed great weight on whether there was evidence of 
preparation as merely restating the problem of determining whether an 
attempt was consummated.71 The court perceived that stopping, deter-
ring, and reforming a person who has attempted to commit a crime is as 
important as the concern for the person who already has completed the 
offense. 72 
The court determined that the initiation for police action required a 
balancing of society's interests with those of the defendant. 73 After bal-
ancing the opposing interests, the court favored the substantial step test 
over the proximity test, the probable desistence test, and the equivocality 
test because the substantial step test enables police to intervene at an 
earlier stage 74 and is easier to apply to the numerous factual situations 
that may occur.75 
After applying the substantial step test, the court concluded that the 
evidence supported the finding that the defendant had committed the 
65. See Wiley v. State, 237 Md. 659, 207 A.2d 478 (1965). 
66. See Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 307, 493 A.2d 352, 357 (1985). 
67. See In reAppeal No. 568, Term 1974, 25 Md. App. 218, 333 A.2d 649, cert. denied, 
275 Md. 751 (1975); Waters v. State, 2 Md. App. 216, 234 A.2d 147 (1967), cert. 
denied, 259 Md. 737 (1970). 
68. See Frye v. State, 62 Md. App. 310,489 A.2d 71 (1985); Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 
238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979). 
69. 303 Md. 298, 493 A.2d 352 (1985). 
70. Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 311, 493 A.2d 352, 358-59 (1985). 
71. !d. at 303, 493 A.2d at 354. The court acknowledged that, although the offense of 
criminal attempt is deeply inbedded as part of the criminal law of Maryland, only a 
limited number of rulings had construed the offense. !d. at 301-04, 493 A.2d at 353-
55. 
72. !d. at 300-01, 493 A.2d at 353 (citing Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, CRIM. L. 
REV. 505, 511 (1970)). 
73. !d. at 308, 493 A.2d at 357. 
74. !d. at 309, 493 A.2d at 357. 
75. !d. at 311, 493 A.2d at 358-59. 
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crime of attempted armed robbery. 76 The court ruled that the defend-
ant's actions were not typical of law-abiding citizens and his unsuccessful 
attempt to open the bank door constituted a substantial step toward the 
commission of the intended crime. 77 
Although focusing primarily on the overt act, the court summarily 
addressed the defenses of abandonment and impossibility.78 The court 
reaffirmed Maryland's view that the abandonment defense is unavailable 
once an overt act is performed79 and noted that legal and not factual 
impossibility is permitted in Maryland. 80 
Young demonstrates a willingness by the Maryland judiciary to act 
where the legislature has refused to act. Although only one other juris-
diction has adopted the substantial step test by judicial fiat, 81 Maryland 
joins the growing number of jurisdicitons that follow the Code's guide-
lines for determining liability for criminal attempt. 82 
The adoption of the substantial step test will have a positive effect on 
the law of criminal attempt in Maryland. Assuming that a defendant's 
criminal conduct continues from preparation to completion, the guide-
lines set forth in the substantial step test permit the police to intervene at 
an earlier stage83 than Maryland's prior test for criminal attempt, which 
resembled the proximity test. 84 Society is better protected because 
criminals attempting a substantive crime will be arrested earlier in the 
attempt. Although broadening the scope of attempt liability,85 the sub-
stantial step test may not result in a significant increase in the number of 
attempt convictions because the test merely identifies at an earlier point 
individuals who are already predisposed to committing a criminal act. 86 
The substantial step test also provides the trier of fact with practical 
guidelines to identify criminal attempt conduct. Under prior case law, 
the trier of fact was left with little assistance in determining when the 
76. /d. at 314, 493 A.2d at 360. 
77. /d. 
78. /d. at 304, 493 A.2d at 355. The Young court stated that the court of appeals has 
not approved or disapproved of the views expressed by the court of special appeals. 
/d. 
79. /d. at 307, 493 A.2d at 356-57. 
80. /d. at 308 n.6, 493 A.2d at 357 n.6. 
81. See State v. Latraverse, 443 A.2d 890 (R.I. 1982); see also Note, Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island, supra note 11. 
82. See Young, 303 Md. at 315-17, 493 A.2d at 360-61. 
83. /d. at 314, 493 A.2d at 360; see also Note, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, supra 
note 11, at 346-47. Compare United States v. Busic, 549 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 
1977) (the determination of whether a person is chargeable with criminal attempt 
will focus on the point where the conduct of the accused has progressed sufficiently 
to minimize the risk of an unfair conviction) with People v. Terrall, 99 Ill. 2d 427, 
435, 459 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (1984) (it should not be necessary to subject the victim 
to a face to face confrontation with a lethal weapon in order to make a positive 
finding of the essential element of a substantial step). 
84. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
85. See United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941 
(1971). 
86. /d. 
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defendant completed the attempt. By replacing "mere preparation"87 
with seven examples of conduct that define a relatively firm commitment 
to complete a crime, 88 the substantial step test permits the trier of fact to 
apply objectively the law to a given situation. The absence of such clear 
examples of attempt historically has plagued Maryland courts. 89 
Nevertheless, the Young court's failure to allow abandonment and 
reject legal impossibility as defenses to criminal attempt reveals an incon-
sistent focus in the area of criminal attempt. By rejecting the minority 
tests and adopting the substantial step test, the court has shifted the focus 
in determining criminal attempt liability from the defendant's proximity 
to the completed crime to the defendant's dangerousness. Conversely, 
without the abandonment defense an actor, who has completed an overt 
act, is deprived of an opportunity to avoid criminal liability even though 
he subsequently may desist from further criminal conduct. Allowing 
legal impossibility as a defense is an additional inconsistency because it 
permits an actor who has demonstrated a propensity to commit a danger-
ous act to avoid criminal liability. For a consistent and logical focus on 
the defendant's dangerousness in the area of criminal attempt, either the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland or the Maryland legislature should follow 
the Code by permitting abandonment and denying legal impossibility as 
defenses to criminal attempt. 
In a demonstration of judicial activisim, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has improved the law of criminal attempt by adopting the sub-
stantial step test. By permitting the police to stop criminal activity at an 
earlier stage, the substantial step test will provide better protection for 
society without jeopardizing the rights of individuals. In addition, the 
law of attempt will be applied more consistently to various factual situa-
tions because the substantial step test provides more objective criteria 
than earlier Maryland case law. Nevertheless, the Young court also 
should have permitted abandonment and rejected legal impossibility as 
defenses to criminal attempt. For the law of criminal attempt in Mary-
land to be consistent, the focus in determining criminal attempt liability 
should be on the dangerousness of the defendant. 
A. Dean Stocksdale 
87. See Young, 303 Md. at 308, 493 A.2d at 357. 
88. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
89. See Young, 303 Md. at 303, 493 A.2d at 354. 
